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Abstract-Modal logic is introduced into the modeling of 
discrete-event systems. Analysis within this framework includes 
formal reasoning about what supervisors know or do not know 
about a given system. This model can be used to develop control 
strategies that solve decentralized discrete-event control prob-
lems. When a problem cannot be solved using fully decentralized 
supervisors, reasoning about knowledge may provide guidelines 
for incorporating communication and pooled information into the 
model. 
Index Terms-Automata, discrete-event systems, modal logic. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A DISCRETE-EVENT system (DES) is a set of sequences 
of events that describes the behavior of a physical process. 
A change in the system state of the process is precipitated by 
the occurrence of an action or event and is not time-driven. A 
discrete-event control problem arises when we want to restrict 
the system to performing a specified subset of overall system 
behavior. A solution to a discrete-event control problem exists 
when we can construct an overseer (or supervisor) to achieve the 
desirable (or legal) behavior by either preventing some events 
from taking place (disahling an event) or allowing-but not 
forcing-others to occur (enabling an event). 
Decentralized discrete-event problems originate when more 
than one supervisor is required to ensure that the system avoids 
illegal behavior. In this class of problems, no one supervisor has 
a complete view of the system behavior. The supervisors must 
coordinate, without communication, the disabling and enabling 
of events to realize the legal behavior. In other words, each su-
pervisor must know enough of what the system is doing to make 
conect decisions to turn events off or on. 
Decentralized control problems arise naturally in distributed 
systems. For instance, in telecommunication problems a sender 
and receiver are physically separated by a communication 
channel, so that neither participant sees everything that occurs. 
The framework for decentralized discrete-event control we 
adopt for this work is taken from [ 1] and [2] and is based on the 
theory of formal languages. A discrete-event system is viewed 
as a generator of a formal language and establishing control 
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for the system amounts to determining which sequences in the 
language should be recognized by each supervisor. Intrinsic to 
the study of these processes is the informal argument that as 
long as at least one supervisor knows the correct control action 
to take in preventing illegal behavior of the system, an overall 
control strategy may be synthesized. 
In most formulations of decentralized discrete-event control 
problems, decisions are based solely on what each supervisor 
observes. A control solution cannot be constrncted if, after ob-
serving some sequence of events, there is no supervisor that 
"knows enough" to disable a particular event. When such a stale-
mate is reached, it means that, in isolation, a supervisor lacks 
appropriate information to make the correct control decision. 
However, if supervisors could access their collective knowledge 
about the situation, thereby eliminating some of the uncertainty 
in making the correct control decision, it may be the case that a 
control strategy can be formulated. 
We are interested in recasting this discrete-event control 
framework into knowledge theory [3] for two reasons: 1) to 
explain, in more intuitive terms, the structure of the system 
and the behavior of controllers that solve decentralized DES 
problems and 2) to formally reason about what supervisors 
need to know to solve control problems. As noted above, 
informal reasoning about knowledge is already an integral part 
of analyzing decentralized supervisory control problems. Thus 
it seems natural to formally consider what it means for each 
supervisor to "know enough." 
Halpern and Moses [3] formulated a model of knowledge 
(based on modal logic) to analyze distributed systems. This 
model is based on the concept of possible worlds. The idea is 
that an agent (equivalent to the notion of an overseer) has only 
a partial view of the distributed system and may be unable to 
distinguish different system states from the true state of the 
system. An agent's knowledge of the system depends only on 
its local view of the system behavior. As an agent acquires 
more knowledge, there are fewer worlds or system states the 
agent considers as possible. When an agent has insufficient 
knowledge, the model allows us to consider the knowledge of 
groups of agents. We consider this aspect of the knowledge 
model to determine if combining the knowledge of two DES 
supervisors will produce "enough" information to reach a 
control solution. 
The knowledge ascribed to supervisors is, by itself, insuf-
ficient to adequately capture overall system behavior since a 
supervisor only uses knowledge to take a particular action. 
The interaction between knowledge and action is expressed 
in a knowledge-based protocol [4]. In situations where a 
DES supervisor has insufficient knowledge to make a control 
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decision, we envision actions being taken on the basis of the 
knowledge acquired through communication. 
Reasoning about knowledge has been part of the analysis of 
a variety of applications in the areas of economics [ 5], [ 6], com-
puter security [7], distributed database systems [8], robotics [9], 
and communication problems [10). Temporal logic has been ap-
plied to the study of supervisory control problems [ 11], [ 12] and 
modal logic has been used as the basis for a computer language 
that simulates discrete-event processes [ 13]; however, a formal 
model of knowledge has yet to be incorporated into the study of 
discrete-event control problems. 
In this paper we establish that standard decentralized DES 
concepts can be equivalently expressed in knowledge theory. 
In the DES framework of Ramadge and Wonham [1], super-
visors determine whether any given sequence is a member 
of the legal language. In the knowledge theory setting, the 
basic variables correspond to answers to questions such as 
"is fact p true?" or "does an agent know that fact p is true?" 
When we apply knowledge theory to decentralized DES, 
supervisors determine whether they have the knowledge 
to disable an event. A fact p in the knowledge model for 
DES corresponds to whether event a is legal at a given 
state of the system. We restrict our attention in this paper 
to reasoning about whether an agent knows to disable event 
a (based on what an agent directly observes). However, the 
knowledge formalism gives us a means of expressing more 
complex statements that could guide decision-making in 
reaching a control solution. For instance, we can say "agent 
1 knows that agent 2 does not know to disable event a." By 
characterizing the nature of knowledge in a discrete-event 
control system in this manner, we can investigate what 
additional information a supervisor needs when it does 
not know whether to take a disable action. Our long-term 
research goal is to understand how and when the dissem-
ination of knowledge among supervisors leads to control 
solutions for a class of control problems that decentralized 
supervisory control theory does not presently address. For 
those problems, communication between supervisors could 
be a means of improving the knowledge each supervisor 
possesses. In addition to presenting the decentralized DES 
framework recast in knowledge theory, we also suggest some 
of the features of knowledge logic that we hope to exploit 
in establishing what information needs to be communicated 
to provide DES supervisors with enough knowledge to solve 
control problems. 
Recently, there has been some work on incorporating commu-
nication into decentralized control: an algebraic approach [14] 
and models that use information structures from stochastic con-
trol [15], [16]. In addition there has been some work on the role 
communication plays in a distributed diagnoser [ 17] and an al-
gorithm for minimal communication in distributed systems [18]. 
We begin by providing a brief background of DES theory and 
of knowledge logic. Section III introduces the knowledge model 
we apply to DES. Section IV contains the knowledge-based pro-
tocol that we propose for guiding the actions of decentralized 
agents. We then present several examples that illustrate how 
to introduce knowledge into the analysis of decentralized DES 
problems. 
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II. BACKGROUND AND NOTATION 
One of the difficulties in bringing together the notation from 
two established fields is addressing the overlap of symbols used 
to represent distinctly different concepts. We have tried to ac-
commodate the more serious notational discrepancies, but also 
include references that can be consulted for further clarification. 
A. Discrete-Event Systems 
This work adopts the framework for discrete-event systems as 
developed by Ramadge and Wonham [ 1]. A brief review of es-
sential notation is provided in this section. More comprehensive 
introductions to discrete-event control theory include [19], [l], 
[20], [21]. References for decentralized control include [22]-
[25], [2], [26], [27]. 
The discrete-event control theory of Ramadge and Wonham 
entails the system requiring control (the plant) to be described 
as a generator of a formal language (i.e., a state machine). The 
behavior of the plant is represented by sequences constructed 
from a non-empty set of symbols called an alphabet. The al-
phabet represents the set of all possible events that can occur 
within the system. Transitions from one system state to another 
do not depend on the passage of time, but rather, on the occur-
rence of an event. Also specified is a second generator: one that 
describes the desirable or legal behavior of the plant and there-
fore generates the legal language. The goal is to develop a con-
trol strategy for a supervisor that will constrain the behavior of 
the plant to that of the legal language. The supervisor averts un-
desirable behavior of the plant by disabling those events whose 
occurrence would lead to an illegal sequence. 
More formally, the plant is modeled by an automaton G = 
( Q0 , E, 8°, qg), where Q0 is a set of states; Eis the alphabet; 
8° is the transition function, a partial function 8°: E x Q0 -+ 
Q0 ; and q~ E Q0 is the initial state. The set E* contains all 
possible finite strings (i.e., sequences) over E plus the null string 
c. The language generated by the plant G, denoted L( G), is a 
subset of E* and is defined as follows: L( G) := { tJt E E* and 
8°(t, q<;f) is defined}. 
For any strings t and u E E*, we say that u is a prefix of 
t if :J v E E* such that t = uv. Thus every string t E E* 
(where t -:f. c) has at least two prefixes: c: and t. If L ~ E*, the 
prefix-closure of L is a language, denoted by L, consisting of 
all prefixes of strings of L:L := { u E E*: u is a prefix oft}. 
Because every string is a prefix of itself, L ~ L. A language 
is said to be prefix-closed if L = L. By definition, L( G) is 
prefix-closed. 
We also describe the legal behavior of the plant as an au-
tomaton E = ( QE, E, 5E, qf) and the legal language is de-
noted L(E). We assume that Eis a subautomaton of Gas de-
scribed in the context of supervisory control in [28] and [29]. 
That is, QE ~ QG, qf ::= q~ and oE(t, q~) = 8°(t, q~) for 
all t E L(E). 
A plant is represented by a finite-state machine or a directed 
graph, as shown in Fig. 1, where the nodes of the graph are the 
states in Q, the arcs of the graph are the transitions defined by 
the function 8°, labels for the arcs are the events in E, and the 
initial state is identified by a small entry arrow. Thus for any 
event a E E and state q E Q0 , o0 (a, q) is defined (written 
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Fig. I. A plant G and its legal automaton E. Illegal transitions are indicated 
with a dashed line. 
8° ( O', q) ! ) if there is an arc labeled by O' from q to some other 
state. The definition for 8° can be extended to a partial function 
for E* x Q0 , so that 8°(t, q) = q', fort E L(G), means 
that state q' can be reached from state q via the sequence t. In 
Fig. 1, we can say both 8°('y, 4) = 6 and 8°(a/3'y, O) = 6 
because event "! is defined as a transition from state 4 to state 6 
and because there is some path from the initial state 0 to state 6 
for sequence a(J"'(. 
Formally, a supervisor Sis a pair (T, 'If;) in which T is an au-
tomaton T = (X, E, e, Xo). where x is a set of states for the 
supervisor; Eis the alphabet used by G; e is the transition junc-
tion, a partial function e: E x X -+ X; x 0 is the initial state 
for the supervisor; and 'l.j;, called a feedback map, is given by 
'I./;: E x X -+ {disable, enable} satisfying 'If;( O', x) = enable 
if O' E Euc, x E X, and 'l/J(O', x) E {disable, enable} if 
a E Ee, x E X. That is, 'If; is interpreted as a rule for dis-
ablement and ensures that uncontrollable events are never dis-
abled. The automaton T monitors the behavior of G and changes 
state according to the events generated by G. The control rule 
'l/J( O', x) indicates whether a should be enabled or disabled at 
the corresponding state in G. The behavior of G when it is con-
strained by S is described by the automaton S / G, called a su-
pervised discrete-event system: 
s /G = (E, Q x x, (8 x e).P' (qo, Xo)). 
The behavior of S / G is described by L( S / G). The modified 
transition function ( 8 x e)"' is defined as a mapping E x Q x 
X-+ Q x X: 
(8 x ff"(O', (q, x)) 
:= { (8(a, q), e(a, x)), 
undefined, 
if 8(0', q)! 
/\e(O', x) ! 
/\'lj;(a, x) = 
enable; 
otherwise. 
There are some systems of which not all events can be seen 
by the supervisor. In this case, a supervisor has only a partial 
view of the system. When the application requires more than 
one such supervisor to achieve the desirable behavior, this leads 
to a decentralized discrete-event problem. 
Now that a supervisor may no longer see every event in a 
sequence t, we need a formal way to represent the events that 
it does see. Suppose a supervisor i can only observe events in 
some set Ei, o ~ E. For decentralized control problems with n 
supervisors, a projection operator Pi is defined for each super-
visor and is a mapping from E* to Ei 0 , for i = 1, · .. , n. This 
operator effectively "erases" those eiements a from a string t 
that are not found in the set of observable events Ei, 0 
Pi(e:) = c 
Pi(O')=c, O'EE\Ei,o 
Pi ( O') = cr, cr E Ei, o 
Pi(ta) =Pi(t)Pi(cr), t EE*, a E 'E. (1) 
Thus if the plant generates sequence t, then P; ( t) indicates the 
sequence of events observed by supervisor i. 
Informally, a supervisor is an agent that has the ability to con-
trol some events based on a partial view of the plant's behavior. 
To establish such supervision on G, we partition the set of events 
E into the disjoint sets Ee. controllable events, and Euc• un-
controllable events. Controllable events are those events whose 
occurrence is preventable (i.e., may be disabled). For decentral-
ized control problems, the set of events each supervisor controls 
is denoted by Ei, c where we assume :Ei, c ~ Ee. Uncontrol-
lable events are those events which cannot be prevented and are 
deemed permanently enabled. 
Consider two local supervisors acting on G to be 
where T1 = (X, E, e, xo) and T2 = (Y, E, 71, Yo). The con-
junction of S1 and S2 is the supervisor 
where 
T1 x T2 := (X x Y, E, ex 71, (xo, Yo)) 
and(}' E :E, x E x. y E y => 
(e x ri)(a, x, y) 
:= { (e(a, x), 71(a, y)), 
undefined, 
(</> * '1/J)(a, x, y) 
if e(a, x)! 
/\ry(a, y)! 
otherwise 
:= { disable, 
enable, 
if if>( a, x) = disable 
V'lj;(O', y) =disable 
otherwise. 
That is, the composite supervisor S 1 /\ S2 disables an event if 
either S1 or S2 issues a disablement command. when a super-
visor S is the result of a conjunction of two supervisors S 1 and 
S2, we write S = (S1, S2). 
It is often convenient in the case of partial observability, to de-
fine a supervisor Si only in terms of events i~ :Ei, e and Ei, 0 • In 
this case Si can be extended to a supervisor Si. The local super-
visor Si acts only on events in Ei, e ~ E and observes events in 
E;, o ~ E while S; takes the same control action as Si on Ei, c. 
enables all events in :E \ Ei, e. makes the same transitions as Si 
on :Ei, o fil!d stays at the same state for events in E \ Ei, 0 • A su-
pervisor Si that acts on all of E and mirrors the control actions 
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of a supervisor S; that observes and controls only a subset of E 
is called the global extension of S;. 
The decentralized problem we consider is described in [2]: 
Given a plant Gover an alphabet E (with controllable events 
E1, c' 2::2, c s.;; E and observable events E1, 0 , l::2, 0 s.;; I:), 
and an automaton E, where L(E) represents legal sequences, 
L(E) ~ L( G) and L(E) -f. (/),find local supervisors S1 and S2 
such that S1 !\ S2 is a supervisor for G and such that 
(2) 
Here, for ·i = 1, 2, local supervisor S; can observe only events 
in L:;, 0 and can control only events in L:;, c and S; is the global 
extension of S;. The set of uncontrollable events, L:uc, is under-
stood to be I:\ (E1,c LJ E2,c). 
To describe a solution to the above problem, it is convenient 
to use the notion of controllability [l]. Given Gover an alphabet 
L:, for a language K ~ L( G), K is controllable with respect to 
G if 
KL:uc n L(G) ~ K (3) 
where KE"c ·- {tcrit E K and er E I:uc}- If we think of 
K as a set of "legal" sequences, then we want to know when it 
will be impossible to stop an illegal sequence from happening. 
It must be that the introduction of an uncontrollable event into 
a legal sequence results in another legal sequence. Therefore, to 
solve (2), it is necessary that L(E) be controllable. If L(E) is 
not controllable, a supremal controllable sublanguage of L(E), 
possibly 0, denoted sup Q(L(E), G), can always be found [l]. 
The standard solution to the centralized control problem with 
full observation produces a supervisor that acts on G to gen-
erate sup C(L(E), G).The important point to note is that such 
a solution is said to be "minimally restrictive," in that the su-
pervisor disables events in G only when absolutely necessary to 
prevent an illegal sequence from occurring. That is, the largest 
possible subset of legal sequences is generated. 
A necessary and sufficient condition for the solution to 
the above decentralized problem can be found using the 
notion of co-observability. Given G over an alphabet E, sets 
E1,c, E2.c, E1,o, E2,o s.;; E, projections P1: L:* ----> Ei, 0 , 
P2: E* ----> E2, 0 , a prefix-closed language K ~ L(G) is 
co-observable with respect to G, P 1 , P 2 if 
Vt, t', t" EE*, P1(t) = P1(t1), P2(t) = P2(t11 )::::} 
(Vcr E E1,c n E2,c)t EK!\ ser E L(G) !\ t'er, t"er EK 
::::} tcr E K conjunct 1 
!\ (Vcr E E1,c \ E2,c)t EK/\ ter E L(G) !\ t'er EK 
::::} tcr E K conjunct 2 
/\ (Vcr E E2,c \ E1,c)t EK/\ ter E L(G) !\ t"a EK 
=:?to-EK conjunct 3. 
We would like a decentralized supervisor's view of a string to 
be enough for it to take the correct control action. If both super-
visors can control the event in question (i.e., conjunct 1), then 
we just need one of the supervisors to be able to have an unam-
biguous view of the strings t, t', t" to make the correct control 
decision regarding er. However, when an event is controlled by 
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only one supervisor (i.e., conjuncts 2 and 3), then that super-
visor's view oft, t', t" must be sufficient to decide on the con-
trol action for a. 
It is now possible to discuss the existence of a solution to the 
decentralized problem. The following theorem (along with its 
proof) appears as Theorem 4.1 in [2]: 
Theorem 1: There exist supervisors S1 and S2 that solve the 
above decentralized supervisory control problem if and only if 
L( E) is controllable with respect to G and co-observable with 
respect to G, P1, P2. 
Thus we can find decentralized controllers that synthesize 
L( E) provided that the legal language satisfies the properties 
of controllability and co-observability. While it is possible to 
find the supremal controllable sublanguage of L(E), if L(E) 
is not co-observable there is no unique supremal co-observable 
sublanguage of L(E). 
B. A Model for Knowledge 
The framework for the modeling knowledge used is based 
on a knowledge logic for distributed systems [3], where mul-
tiple agents reason about their knowledge of the world. An agent 
could be a human, a machine (e.g., a robot) or even a compo-
nent of a machine (e.g., an electrical circuit). Unless otherwise 
indicated, the definitions and results in this section are adopted 
from [30]. The model assumes that if an agent does not have 
complete knowledge of the true state of the world, it assumes a 
number of worlds are possible. The world is described in terms 
of a non-empty set <I> of facts or primitive propositions. More 
complicated formulas are constructed using expressions from 
propositional calculus: ..., for negation and /\ for conjunction In 
addition, tp V '~J represents ..., ( 'lfJ !\ -,'lj;). 
The system model is conceptually divided into two compo-
nents: the agents and the environment. The latter captures the 
relevant aspects of the system that are not part of the descrip-
tion of agent behavior. We assume that there is a set of agents 
G = { 1, · · · , n} to which we ascribe knowledge about the 
system. 
The system behavior is captured by a global state. A 
global state is an (n + 1 )-tuple, denoted w, that records 
the state of the environment and the local state-an agent's 
set of possible worlds-for each of the n agents. Formally 
w = (we, w1, · · ·, wn)· We can further refer to individual 
components of w: w,, and Wi represent the local state of the 
environment and agent i (for i E { 1, · · · , n} ), respectively. 
We will reason about what an agent knows about the truth 
of facts in the system at global states. Knowledge of a fact 
is expressed using modal operators (one for each agent) 
K 1, · · · , Kn. Thus K 1p, where p E <.P, is interpreted as "agent 
1 knows p." 
The semantics of the possible-worlds model is formal-
ized using Kripke structures. A Kripke structure M is an 
(n + 2)-tuple containing a set of worlds (e.g., global states), an 
interpretation function 7r that assigns truth values at each world 
w to the primitive propositions in <.P (e.g., 7r(w)(p) = false), 
and possibility relations, one for each agent, that define binary 
relations on the set of worlds. That is, the relation defines the 
set of worlds that look alike to an agent at any given world 
in the system. The possibility relation is typically not defined 
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Fig. 2. A simple Kripke structure. 
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for the environment since we are not interested in ascribing 
knowledge to the environment. 
A Kripke structure is also expressible as a labeled graph. In 
particular, nodes are worlds and edge labels (sets of agents) cap-
ture the possibility relation. For instance, worlds that look alike 
to agent i are joined by an edge with a label "i." Each world is 
also labeled with the truth values of all primitive propositions 
p E ~, where we use the notation "-,p" to indicate that the truth 
value of p is false and "p" corresponds to a value of true. 
The following example illustrates a simple Kripke structure 
and is adapted from [30]. The graphical representation of this 
system is shown in Fig. 2. Suppose ~ = {p} and n = 2. Let 
the set of worlds be {A, B, C} and the interpretation function be 
defined such that proposition p is true at worlds B and C but false 
at state A (i.e., 7r(A)(p) =false, rr(B)(p) = 7r(C)(p) =true). 
The possibility relations for the agents are defined as follows: 
agent 1 cannot tell the difference between A and B while worlds 
B and C look alike to Agent 2. These relations are captured in 
Fig. 2 by the edge label of "l" joining worlds A and Band the 
edge label "2" joining worlds Band C. The self-loops at all three 
worlds with edge label "1,2" indicate that an agent cannot distin-
guish a given state from itself. For example, in addition to state 
B looking like A to agent 1, state A also looks like state A. For 
purposes of this discussion, the possibility relation is always an 
equivalence relation and therefore, it is always the case that re-
flexivity and symmetry hold. Therefore, from now on, self-loops 
and arrows will be omitted from diagrams of Kripke structures. 
We now have all the components we need to reason about 
knowledge: a set of worlds describing the behavior of the system 
and an interpretation rr to analyze truth values of the proposi-
tions at each world in the system. Together the set of worlds 
and 7r define an interpreted system, denoted by I. 
To discuss knowledge in an interpreted system, we assume 
that the possibility relation is defined as follows. Let w, w' be 
two worlds in I. We say w and w' are indistinguishable to agent 
i ifthe local state according to agent i is the same at both worlds: 
w "'i w'ifw.; = w~. (4) 
To discuss what it means for a fact p to be true at a particular 
world in I, we use the notation (I, w) I= p, which can be 
read as "p is true at (I, w)" or "p holds at (I, w)". A fact p 
holds at a state w if the truth value as defined by rr is true at w. 
For example, at world B in Fig. 2, we can say p is true because 
7r(B)(p) = true. More formally: 
(I,w)l=P (for p E ~) iff rr(w)(p) =true. 
The clause for negation indicates that -ip is true at world w 
exactly if p is not true: 
(I, w) I= -ip iff (I, w) ~ p. 
In Fig. 2, we can say at world A, -ip holds because p is not true 
at A. 
We can consider more than one fact holding at a world: 
Thus, the conjunction of two propositions holds at w if it is the 
case that each proposition is true at w. 
What does it mean for an agent to know facts in its world? An 
agent knows a fact p at w if p holds at all worlds that the agent 
cannot distinguish from w: 
(I, w) I= Kip iff (I, w') I= p, 
\:/ w' such that w "'i w'. (5) 
Referring to Fig. 2 again, we can now describe the knowledge 
of agents at any world in the system: e.g., at world B, the for-
mula -iK1p /\ K 2p holds. That is, at world B agent 1 does not 
know whether p is true, while at world B agent 2 knows that p 
is true. At world B, agent 1 considers the existence of two pos-
sible worlds: A and B. It considers both p and -ip to be possible 
because p is false at world A while p is true at world B. Agent 
2 also considers the existence of two possible worlds: B and C. 
However, since p holds at both those worlds, at B agent 2 knows 
that p is true. 
It follows that if at w an agent knows p, it also knows p at all 
other worlds it considers possible at w: 
(I, w) I= Kip iff (I, w') I= Kip (6) 
for all w' such that w "'i w'. For instance, agent 2 considers 
that worlds B and C "look alike." Since p is true at both these 
worlds, we can say that at world B, agent 2 knows p. Similarly, 
we can say that at world C agent 2 also knows p. 
Finally, we note a property, called the Knowledge Axiom, that 
states if an agent knows a fact, then the fact is true: 
(I, w) I= Kip'* (I, w) I= p. (7) 
Note that since Kip holds at some world w, we know by (6) that 
Kip holds at all worlds that agent i cannot distinguish from w. 
Since p is true in all worlds that agent i considers possible, in 
particular, p is true at w. 
III. A KNOWLEDGE MODEL FOR DES 
In this section we describe how to recast decentralized super-
visory control problems as interpreted systems. We do not claim 
that the reformulation of this problem provides a more efficient 
solution but, rather, suggest that knowledge theory provides a 
more natural way of thinking about discrete-event control prob-
lems. 
A. The Interpreted System yDES 
We denote our "sequence-based" interpreted system for de-
scribing decentralized discrete-event systems as z0 E8 (G, E). 
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Like local supervisors in the decentralized DES formulation of 
[22], [2]. the agents in this interpreted system make control de-
cisions based on their partial view of the sequences generated 
by the DES plant G. The environment of our interpreted system 
is the language generated by the plant and the agents play a role 
equivalent to that of decentralized DES supervisors. 
A global state for n agents in IDES ( G, E) captures a "snap-
shot" of the sequence generated by the plant language L( G). 
The set of states for the environment is the set of sequences in 
L( G), while the set of local states for the agents is the set of 
sequences each agent observes according to the projection op-
eration of (1 ). More formally, a global state is defined as w = 
(we, W1, · · ·, Wn) = (t, P1(t), · · ·, Pn(t)) fort E L(G). In 
this paper, we will assume that n = 2 so that the group of agents 
is G = { 1. 2}. 
The interpretation 71"DES associated with our interpreted 
system captures the notion of whether or not an event in :B 
is permissible as sequences evolve in the plant. To form <Ii, 
the set of primitive propositions for IDES(G, E), we want 
to associate with each a E 2::: two distinct propositions: ac 
to represent the fact that at a particular state in the plant the 
event is defined (i.e., is possible), and a E to represent the fact 
that at the corresponding state in the legal automaton the event 
is defined. The propositions are defined in terms of events 
because we want to reason about the knowledge an agent 
has of the occurrence of an event, instead of, for instance, a 
certain sequence. If E is finite (i.e., I :BJ = N); it can be written 
as E = {a1, a2, · · ·, aN }. Define the set of propositions 
<Pc = { af Ii = 1, · · · , N} and the set of propositions 
<Ii E = { af Ii = 1, · · ·, N} where <Pc and <1> E contain N 
symbols. Let <1> = <1>c U <1>E. Because we will frequently want 
to associate af with its counterpart af, we define the relation 
RE such that RE<;;; <1>c x <1>E and RE := {(ac, aE)J:l a; E :B 
where ac = af', aE = af}. For convenience, we will use 
the notation O" c (respectively, O" E) without explicit reference 
to RE when we mean O"f (respectively, af). The proposition 
ac is "event a can occur" and O" E is "event a is legal." For 
convenience, we will refer to <Pm· when we need to identify 
those propositions in <P which represent events in Euc (as 
defined in Section II-A). 
The interpretation for the propositions in <1> is defined for all 
a EE 
DES {true, 71" '(w)(O"c):= 
false, 
DES {true, 
7r (w)(O'E) := 
false, 
if b0 ('U!ea, q~)! 
otherwise. 
if bE(wea, qt)! 
otherwise. 
(8) 
In other words, a proposition ac is true at a global state w if 
the event O" happens at the actual plant state reached by we. A 
proposition ac is false (denoted-iac) at world w ifthe event O" 
is not defined directly following the event sequence we. Simi-
larly, a proposition a E is true at world w if the event (J' happens 
directly following the event sequence We and wea is part of the 
legal behavior of the plant. A proposition (J'E is false (denoted 
'O"E) at a global state w if either (J'c is false or if the sequence 
Wea is part of the illegal behavior of the plant. 
1661 
1 (E,E,E) ( cx,a:,f) (~.E,f3) 
2 
aG. Y(; PG 
-icx. Y. p a.nP 
G G G cx:'y.0 G G G 
<cx;iy,p E E E ~:·Y,°:10.: 
F F. E 
2 I 
2 2 2 2 
(cxy,cxy,E) (y,y,E) (f3y,y,f3) 
'a';ly;i~ 2 'a';ly';l~ 
G G C G G G 'ac!yd~c 
-ia·;iy-;if) <cx/yl~ 1 
E E E E E E '~:IY1l~E 
Fig. 3. A portion of the Kripke structure for G in Fig. 1. 
Because the set of worlds in IDES ( G, E) and the truth values 
assigned by rrDES to the primitive propositions in <1> are derived 
from the legal automaton E and the plant G, we can consider 
that IDES has implicit parameters G and E. Thus, for conve-
nience, we drop these arguments for the rest of the paper. 
We illustrate the knowledge model by constructing a Kripke 
structure for the plant and legal automaton in Fig. 1. In this ex-
ample, suppose that agent l sees and controls events c~ and I 
while agent 2 sees event /3 and controls events /3 and 'Y· 
The complete Kripke structure contains ten states, cor-
responding to the ten sequences in L( G). We show a 
representative portion of the structure in Fig. 3. The set of 
propositions is <P = { cr.c, aE, /3c, /h, le, 1 E} and the truth 
assignments for rrDES are made according to (8). For example, 
at global state (a, o:, c), proposition le is assigned a value of 
true because there is a transition of 'Y from sequence o: in the 
plant; however, / E has a truth assignment of false because in 
Fig. 1, the sequence cq is not defined in the legal automaton. 
The possibility relations describe how agents view the world. 
In IDES, the possibility relation for each agent is defined 
using the indistinguishability relation "'i of ( 4 ). That is, two 
global states look alike to an agent i if the global states have 
the same local state according to agent ·i. For instance, the 
possibility relation for agent 1 would contain the pair of states 
((I, /, f), (!h, 1, /3)) because these states have the same 
local state according to agent 1, namely T 
The top half of a node in Fig. 3 contains one of the global 
states in the system and the bottom half of the node shows the 
truth values for the primitive propositions at that global state. 
The diagram exactly describes the states of the plant where we 
want to impose control (as constrained by the legal language) 
and what each agent believes are the possible worlds of this 
system. By following the edges connecting the nodes, we can 
also determine what each agent believes are its possible worlds. 
For instance, the node labeled (/3, f, (3) looks the same to agent 
2 as the node labeled (!Jr, 7, (3) because the local state of agent 
2 is f3 in both the global states. This is indicated by an edge 
labeled "2" joining these nodes. 
We can describe the knowledge of each agent at a particular 
state in the interpreted system. For example, at w = (c, E, c) 
(IDES, w) I= K1(CK0 /\ aE /\re)/\ K2''YE· 
At w the set of worlds that agent 1 considers possible is 
{(c, is, c), ((3, is, /3)}. At both these states the truth values 
1662 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON AUTOMATIC CONTROL, VOL. 45, NO. 9, SEPTEMBER 2000 
of aa, Ci.E and 1G are true. Therefore we say that "Agent 1 
knows a can happen and is legal at (c:, c, c:) and that 1 can 
happen at (c:, c, c:)." Similarly, we say that "Agent 2 knows 
that it is not the case that 'Y is legal at (c:, c:. c)" because at 
all states indistinguishable from (c, c:, c:) to agent 2-namely 
(c:, c, c:), (a, a, c:), (0.1, et/, c) and (a, a, c:)-the formula 
..,/E is true. We can also make note of the lack of knowledge 
an agent has: at w agent 1 does not know whether 'Y is legal be-
cause at ( c, c:, c:) the formula ...,1 E is true while at (,8, c:, /3) the 
formula/Eis true. This is denoted as (IDES, r, m) I= -iKnE 
and is read "Agent 1 does not know whether / is legal at 
(c, c:, c)." 
IV. KNOWLEDGE-BASED PROTOCOLS 
The interpreted system IDES describes the knowledge that 
each agent has concerning the validity of a particular sequence. 
We need to associate actions with an agent's knowledge. For 
instance, if an agent knows that a particular proposition is pos-
sible but not legal for a set of possible worlds, then we want 
it to disable the corresponding event. A knowledge-based pro-
tocol [4] is a strategy that links actions and knowledge for agents 
and the environment. We believe that it is natural to think of 
a supervisor basing its control actions on what the supervisor 
"knows" about the present state of the system. Even though we 
depart from some of the specifics of the formalism for knowl-
edge-based protocols in [4], we incorporate the idea that there 
ought to be a connection between action and knowledge. 
We examine knowledge-based protocols where actions to dis-
able or enable an event are based only on local state information 
and where an uncontrollable event cannot be disabled. We de-
scribe protocols for agents but not for the environment, which 
we view as incapable of taking control actions. For the decen-
tralized DES we consider, when we say that a supervisor S = 
(S1, S2) solves a problem, we mean that when G is under the 
control of S (i.e., when S disables or enables events of G), the 
resultant language generated, namely L((S1 /\ S2)/G), equals 
the legal language: L((S1/\S2)/G) = L(E). Solving the decen-
tralized problem with a knowledge-based protocol amounts to 
constructing a protocol that will ensure that all legal sequences 
and only legal sequences are generated. 
A. A Knowledge-Based Protocol For Decentralized Control 
A local supervisor in a decentralized DES system disables 
controllable event er if the supervisor is able to determine that 
the occurrence of er will lead to illegal behavior; otherwise event 
er is enabled. An event er is disabled if at least one local agent 
takes a "disable er" action. 
The actions that drive the global state changes of the system 
are performed according to a selection rule or protocol. A 
knowledge-based protocol is a protocol where actions are taken 
on the basis of the local knowledge of an agent. We define 
a knowledge-based protocol as a mapping that characterizes 
which events are disabled !(Pi: Li x :E -+ {enable, disable}, 
where Ci is the set of local states for agent i. Since the 
knowledge-based protocol is defined on the local view of an 
agent, the actions of agent i at w are applied at all w' that are 
indistinguishable to agent i at w. Just as a local decentralized 
DES supervisor makes control decisions based on its partial 
view of a sequence, we want an agent to use knowledge and its 
local states to determine if a given event should be disabled. 
A joint knowledge-based protocol is the collection of the 
knowledge-based protocols for all agents in G. 
We identify the group of agents that can control a given event 
as GO' := { i: Cl E Ei, c}. i.e., for all Cl E :E1, c n E2, C• GO' = 
{1, 2}; for all er E E1, c \ E2, c. GO' = {1 }; for all a E E2, c \ 
E1, C• GO' = {2}, and for all (J' E Euc, Ga = 0. 
A joint knowledge-based protocol KP = (KP1, KP2) 
solves the decentralized problem if for all w E IDES and all 
(ao, C!E) E R:E: 
i) (IDES' w) F (JG /\ """1(JE :::} 
(:Ji E Ga)lCPi(w;, a)= disable 
ii) (IDES, w) f= aa /\(TE:::} 
(Jli E G)KPi(wi, a)= disable. 
That is, solving the problem amounts to allowing only legal se-
quences and all legal sequences to occur. Note that since we 
assume that Eis a subautomaton of G, it will never be the case 
that(IDES,w) f= -iaa/\aE. 
To solve the decentralized control problem using knowledge-
based protocols we must formalize what it means for agents 
to "know enough." We describe several conditions that IDES 
must satisfy before a solution can be achieved. In particular, we 
present a necessary and sufficient condition so that our joint 
knowledge-based protocol admits only (and all) the legal se-
quences in L( E). 
We define a property analogous to co-observability [2] and 
controllability [1] that characterizes the nature of knowledge an 
interpreted system requires to yield a decentralized solution to 
the DES control problem. 
Definition I: An interpreted system IDES is Kripke-observ-
able if: 
'iw EIDEs, \::/((Ja, r:rE) E R:E, 
(IDES, w) f= -iaa V (TE 
V (3i E Ga) such that (IDES, w) f= Ki..,O"E· 
(9) 
That is, if an illegal event q is about to occur, at least one agent 
that can control (T knows that it should be disabled. We note here 
that co-observability is a condition on set membership and set 
containment for sets of sequences while Kripke-observability 
involves logic tests on propositions. 
The condition we were initially trying to capture in the defi-
nition of Kripke-observability was that for every event that can 
occur, at least one agent knows whether or not that event is legal. 
Our intuition led us to the following logic formulation: 
'i w E IDES, 
(:l i E Gu) 
'i(r:ra, O'E) ERE, 
such that (IDES, w) f= KiaE V Ki-,CTE· 
(10) 
However, this is actually too strong a condition as the following 
example will illustrate. 
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The plant and legal automaton in Fig. 4 represent a 
co-observable language (with supervisors S1 and S 2 ) if 
2~1." = {n} = )_:t,,,. 2=2.0 = {/1}, and 1::2,,, = {cl!,/:J}. Thus a 
control strategy for this decentralized problem is as follows: S 1 
disables o after seeing o and S2 disables n after seeing /1/1. If 
we were to use the condition in (!OJ, then the condition would 
fail at 11• = (E. E. At this state. the possible worlds of agent 
I are { . E. c), (f1, E. 11), and C-:1/'3, e, /3fJ). Both disjuncts of 
(10) fail for event n at w since (JDES, ·111) f= l.1!E, whereas 
at w' and w",_~hen 1111 = (/i, c, /'i) and w" = (/1/1, e, /:J/1), 
we have (IDl•.s. w') ~"" -.1,E and (IDEs. r", rn.") f= -inE. 
The possible worlds for agent 2 at w = ( e, e. c:) are states 
11'1 :::= (n. n. ), 11' 11 = (1m. nn, t:) and ·w itself. As it did for 
agent I, both disjuncts foil on event n at all states indistinguish-
able from1~1 since (11JES_ 1u) f= nr; while (IDES, w') f: 'i<F 
and ( Jll l"s. 1u 11 ) F -io I':. In fact, the failure to meet the 
condition of ( 10) was because we required an agent to know 
when an event should be enabled. 
This observation led to a revised definition: 
Vil' <::IDES V(rrc;. rTE) E Ri~. 
(I .. nr-:s. t . 
. w)prr"· 
V (]i E G") suchthat(IDl·:s.11,) f= l<;·vrr·:· 
(] I) 
Now that the condition in ( 11) does not insist on knowledge 
if th1.• event is legal, this updated condition is satisfied for event 
n at all states in Fig. 4. However, Fig. 5 shows another co-ob-
servable system where (I I) also fails. Let )~ i," ""' {a}, )>~ 1,,. =-: 
{n .. J}, '" {11},>::1.1 '"' {11}.Thereisaproblemwith 
event /I, even though this event never needs to be disabled. At 
stat.e 11 1 ( o, n, ) . agent 2 neither knows that /1. should be 
disabled nor that it should not be disabled since (InEs, w) F 
1/1 /., while at 11'1 {(, , ) , anti therefore IU rv'.l W 1, it is the 
case that ( 1'1>E\ w') I=" 111·:. Therefore, at 111 neither disjunct of 
condition ( 11) is satisfied, Since 11 cannot actually happen after 
o <){.'.curs, it is too strong to require than an agent possess any 
knowledge about 11 at w. 
If Wt~ use thi: definition of ( 9 ), the system of Fig. 5 is Kripke-
ohservabk. In pmticular, at state 111 (it. it. c.·), the first dis-
jum:t for event ,, is now satisfied: cr1 Jl·:s, w) [:: -"jl(;. 
Note that eve:n though the definitions in (I 0) anJ ( 11) fail on 
this example system, there is still a solution to the problem. This 
is bec<1usc the default adion is to enable an event when no agent 
know:-. whether or not to tlisablc that event. The requirement in 
the first dh;junct of ( l 0) to know that the event should be en-
abled is too strong. Similarly ( 11) fails as we neglected to notice 
that we can omit knowledge tests on "do not care" states, that 
is, global states where events are not even defined in the corre-
sponding DES plant states. Hence this knowledge condition can 
be relaxed so that a test for knowledge is only performed when 
an event a is possible but is not legal (i.e., when the disjunct 
··rrc; V rr ;.: does not hold). 
71ietmm1 2: Given G. 1-;, there exists a joint knowl-
edgt: .. bascd protocol ;...:p (!\.:P1, J(P~) th<tt solves the 
dceentrnli7,ed problem iff 1rms ( G, !'.:) is Kripke-observable. 
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Fig. 4. A plant G and legal automaton E. (Illegal transitions are marked with 
a dashed line.) 
Fig. 5. A plant G and legal automaton E. (Illegal transitions are marked with 
a dashed linc.J 
Pro<if: ( {::;) Suppose zDES is Kripke-observable. Define the 
following knowledge-based protocol: 
(VP E L;)(Vrr E 1:) 
{ 
dis ah/I:. 
(Vi E Grr)K:'P,(P. (J) = 
en11 hli:, 
(V j ~ G,, )l('Pi(P. rr) == enable. 
if 3111 such 
that P = w; /\ 
(IDES, 'W) F 
K;-i(JE, 
otherwise. 
If an agent knows than an event is illegal, it will disable the 
event. Therefore, unless an agent knows that an event is illegal, 
the event will be enabled. That is, if an agent knows that an 
event is illegal, it will disable the event-hence the motto "know 
means no." Note that for an event controllable by agent i, the 
definition of J(P; in (J 2) is robust to the choice of w in ( 12) 
(i.e .. if a different w' were chosen such that P ;:;.:• w'., then by (6), 
(11H:s. w) F' K,··•rrf; iff(IIJES, w') F /(,-.rrE). 
We want to show that A.:'P :.:: ( KP1• K'P2 ) solves the decen-
tralized problem. 
i) Suppose (IDl:s. w) (rru /\ -ir;1·:·), We want to show 
that this irnplies i E: G,,) ;:.,:p, ( w,. (J) == dis(f,hl<:. 
Since ( rrn:s. 'If' j F'" rr (; /1 .,rr le, we have 
( rrw:s. II') !I= ">(J(; v (J E. Thus, since Kripke-ob-
scrvability holds, it must be the case that 3 i E G"' 
such that (:[DES, w) p f{, -1(J Fe'- Therefore either 
A.:'P1 (·w,. rr) ::: di1i11.bl1 or JCP2(wi. r;) :::::: disahl1:. 
ii) Suppose (JDEs. w) f= a<;/\ rrE, We want to show that 
this implies ( J3 i E G) K:P; ( u:,, rr) = 1lisablc. 
The requirement for K:P, (w,, (J) == 11i.rnbfr f()f some i E G,, 
is that (11 >l':S, 111) F' J{, -,(J F .. However, since (IDES. u1) I= 
rr e, we cannot have f:c ](,··:a E-,' for any i [by (7)]. 
Therefore A.:'Pi(w,. 11) 11111/ilr for al! i tf. G,,. By (l 3), for all 
i ff G11 , A:P,(1J11 • 11) 1 no blc. 
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TABLE I 
CHECKING KRIPKE-0BSERVAB!LITY 
w Disjunct of Kripke-observability satisfied 
(i:,c:,i:) 
(/3, c' /3) 
(!, ')",c) 
(a,a,c:) 
({3"(, /, /3) 
(a"f, a1, c:) 
(a/3, a, (3) 
(/30., a, (3) 
(a/3/, a/, /3) 
(i]cq, a1' (3) 
(IDE5,w) F= Kr/E 
(IoEs,w) F 'YE 
(IDE5 ,w) f= Kr-1/E 
(IDE5 ,w) f= K2--.'YE 
(IDES' w) F --,/G 
(IDE5 ,w) f= K2--./E 
(IDES, w) F 'YE 
(IDES,w) FIE 
(IDES,w) F --,/G 
(IDES,w) F ...,/G 
(:::}) We need to show that if IDES is not K.ripke-observable 
then there is no joint knowledge-based protocol KP that solves 
the decentralized problem. 
Suppose that some KP solves the decentralized proble~. 
Since IDES is not K.ripke-observable, there must exist 
w E IDES such that 3(aa,aE) E RE where (Vi E Ga) 
(IDES, w) ~ --.a0 VaE v K;•aE. That is 
(12); 
and for all i E Ga 
(13) 
The expression in (14) implies that (ID ES, w) f= (a a f\ -.a E). 
Since KP solves the decentralized problem, and since 
(IDES, w) f= ( aa /\ •aE ), it must be the case that:l j such that 
KPj ( Wj, O") = disable. Note that (15) holds foragentj and im-
plies that 3 w' such that (IDES, w') f= O"E and w ,.._,j w'. Since 
KP solves the decentralized problem, KPj( wj, a) =j:. disable. 
However, since KPj(Wj, a) = disable, this means that 
KPj(wj, O") = disable (since w ,.._,j w' means that Wj = wj), 
which leads to a contradiction. • 
We want to ensure that the actions taken by agents as a result 
of executing the joint knowledge protocol exactly permit the 
legal language of the DES plant. Therefore, we make precise the 
set of sequences that are generated by the supervised interpreted 
system. 
Definition 2: The language that contains all sequences deter-
mined by the actions of the joint knowledge-based protocol is 
K.C(KP, G), defined as follows: 
c: E K.C, 
WeO" E K.C if 'We E K.C f\ Wea E L( G) 
/\KP;(w;, a)= enable, (i = 1,2). 
Thus a sequence is in K.C if its prefix is already in K.C, the se-
quence is actually generated by the plant and the control action 
at the corresponding global state is to allow u to happen. If a 
"disable a" action is taken at global state w, it is because at 
least one agent knows that wea is not part of the legal language 
and is therefore, by the above definition, not included in K.C. 
(IDES, w) F O:E 
(IDES, w) F O:E 
(IDES, w) F= •aa 
(IDES,w) F •aa 
(IDES,w) f=--iaa 
(IDES,w) F •ac 
(IDES,w) F --.aa 
(IDES,w) F --iaa 
(IDES, w) F •aa 
(IDES,w) f=--iaa 
(IDES,w) F f3E 
czDES,w) F --i/Ja 
(IDES' w) F= •f3a 
(IDES,w) F=/3e 
(IDES' w) F -./Ja 
(IDES,w) F= •/Ja 
(IDES,w) F= •/Ja 
(IDES' w) F= -.(Ja 
(IDES' w) F= --i/3a 
(IDES, w) F •f3a 
B. Example: A Kripke-Observable System 
We return to the plant and legal automaton of Fig. 1 where 
agent 1 sees and controls events a and / while agent 2 sees /3 
but controls both f3 and I. Part of the K.ripke structure associated 
with the plant is shown in Fig. 3. 
We want to show that IDES is Kripke-observable. Let w -
( c:, c:, c:). We want to ascertain that at this state either agent 1 or . 
agent 2 knows to disable T · 
(14) 
Therefore, for Kripke-observability, we must find an agent i 
such that (IDES,w) f= K;--i/E· 
We first check to see if agent 1 has the appropriate knowledge 
about event I· At w = (e:, i:, c:), agent 1 considers one other 
world to be possible: ({3, i:, (3). 
Recall that knowledge of a fact at w requires that the fact hold 
at all states indistinguishable from w. Thus if agent 1 has knowl-
edge that event 1 is not legal at this part of the plant, it must be 
the case that -,'YE holds in the two worlds noted above. Agent 
1 fails to have the required knowledge at state w' = ({3, c:, /3), 
since (IDES, w') f= 'YE· Thus, (IDES, w) f= --iK1 ''YE and we 
must check to see if Kripke-observability is satisfied by agent 
2's knowledge at this state. 
There are three other possible worlds agent 2 cannot distin-
guish from (e:, c:, c:): (a, a, e:), (I,/, c:) and (a1, a/, e:). As 
was the case for agent 1, we need to determine that agent 2 
knows --i/E holds at w. This means that ''YE must hold in all 
worlds that look like ( c, c:, c:) to agent 2. Note that because •"f E 
holds at all four possible worlds, (IDES, w) f= K 2--i/E· • 
A similar check can be performed at every other state in I 0 ES · 
to show that this system is Kripke-observable (summarized in· 
Table I). 
The joint knowledge-based protocol for events o. and /3 in 
this system is straightforward: both events are enabled by both 
agents at every state in IDES. To realize the legal language, 
however, the control decisions for I must ensure that "f is dis-
abled before either agent sees any event occur and that / is 
disabled after a is generated by the plant. At w = (c:, c:, e) 
agent 2 does know to disable "f and thus KP2 ( c:, "f) = disable . . 
This action occurs at all global states where w2 = c:, namely ' 
(a, a, e:)-which makes certain that a.1 will not occur-and 
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TABLE II 
A JOINT KNOWLEDGE-BASED PROTOCOL FOR G AND E AND EVENT ·1 lN FIG. 1 
w KP1(w1,1) K'P2(w2, 1) 
(c,c,e) enable disable 
(/3, e;' /3) enable enable 
(r,/,c) enable disable 
(a,a,e:) enable disable 
(!31, 'Y' /3) enable enable 
(a-y, a1, c) enable disable 
(a/3, a, /3) enable enable 
(/3a, a, /3) enable enable 
(a/31, a1,/3) enable enable 
(/3a1, a-y, /3) enable enable 
at (r, i::, i::) and ( a1, a, i::). The "disable 1" action at the latter 
two states is irrelevant since the previous disablement actions 
will guarantee that we never reach these states. The complete set 
of control actions for event I is summarized in Table II. Note 
that as long as agent i takes a "disable" action for some event at 
wi, this action takes precedence over any other agent's "enable" 
action for the same event at any global states w' "'i w, thereby 
ensuring that the event is disabled in all possible worlds of agent 
·i at w. 
V. DISTRIBUTED OBSERVABILITY 
Previously we considered what it means for an agent to know 
a fact; however, what does it mean for a group of agents to know 
a fact? To find a joint knowledge-based protocol that solves 
the decentralized control problem, we require that the inter-
preted system be Kripke-observable. But even if the system 
is not Kripke-observable, it may be the case that the group of 
agents has the combined knowledge to generate the correct con-
trol strategy. We call this notion of successfully pooling infor-
mation to generate a control decision distributed observability. 
Distributed observability is based on the concept of dis-
tributed knowledge (taken from [30]). Distributed knowledge is 
the weakest form of group knowledge: in essence, a group has 
distributed knowledge of p if after combining all the knowledge 
of the group, p holds. This amounts to taking the intersection 
of all sets of worlds each agent in the group considers possible 
at a given state in the system. 
Definition 3: A group G of agents has distributed knowledge 
of p E <I? at state w, denoted (I, w) f= DGp, iff (I, w') f= p 
for all w' where, for all agents i in a group G, Wi = w£. 
The modal operator DG means "it is distributed knowledge 
among the agents in G" [3]. It could be the case that no individual 
agent knows p, but after combining their possible worlds (i.e., 
take the intersection of the possible worlds for the agents) the 
group of agents knows p--0nly if p holds in all the remaining 
possible worlds of the "intersection." 
Stronger assertions about group knowledge include "ev-
eryone in the group knows p" and common knowledge, where 
"everyone in the group knows p, everyone in the group knows 
that everyone in the group knows p" etc. We do not consider 
these states of knowledge here, but merely note that there 
~o-!--o 
~---0 a Y 
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Fig. 6. A plant G and legal automaton E. (Illegal transitions are marked with 
a dashed line.) 
exists a hierarchy of states of group knowledge for distributed 
systems. 
Distributed knowledge is the key to a concept we introduce, 
called distributed observability: 
Definition 4: An interpreted system IDES has distributed ob-
servability with respect to a group of agents G if 
\:/w E IDES, \:/(ua, UE) E RL; 
(IDES, w) f= •aa V <lE V Da•<lE· 
That is, at all states in the interpreted system where an event 
would need to be disabled, there is distributed knowledge about 
whether to disable that event. Note that if IDES is Kripke-ob-
servable then by definition IDES has distributed observability 
since at every state, for each event in Ee, at least one agent (even 
before pooling knowledge) will know the correct control deci-
sion to make. 
Intuitively, to solve a decentralized problem, even with com-
munication, it would have to be the case that what one agent 
lacks in knowledge or information, the other can supply. Con-
sider the case of sequences t and t' which look alike to both 
agents where t is legal and t' is illegal. If agent l were to com-
municate to agent 2 that it (agent 1) knows that one oft or t' has 
occurred, or if agent 2 were to communicate similar informa-
tion to agent 1, communication will not help the agents make a 
control decision. 
Using the knowledge framework we can exploit the possible-
worlds model to identify system states that are indistinguishable 
to both agents (and where, therefore, information pooling would 
be of no help). Further, we can identify states where an agent's 
ability to make control decisions would be improved by com-
munication. 
We present two examples where the two agents have par-
tial observation of a system: one where the pooling of possible 
worlds is not enough to achieve control and one where we be-
lieve that combined knowledge can achieve control. 
A. Example: When Pooling Knowledge Is Not Enough 
In Fig. 6 the language generated by the legal automaton is 
not Kripke-observable 1 if E1, 0 = {a}, E1, c = {a, 'Y }, E2,o = 
{,B}, and E2, c = {,8}. When agent 1 sees a (equivalently, agent 
2 sees /3), it does not know whether or not a/3 or f3a has oc-
curred. Thus a control decision about 'Y cannot be reached. The 
Kripke structure in Fig. 7 shows that IDES is not Kripke-observ-
able. To see this, suppose the system were Kripke-observable. 
Then when w = (j3a, a, /3), it must be that agent 1 knows ''YE 
1This example arose from discussions K. Rudie had with S. Lafortune, F. Lin, 
A. Overkamp and D. Teneketzis. 
1666 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON AUTOMATIC CONTROL, VOL. 45, NO. 9, SEPTEMBER 2000 
(E,E,E) 
a;iy,() 
G G G 
a;iy,() 
(a,a,c:) E E E (f),E,f3) 
l(X ;iy, 13 
G G G 
a-;iy-;i() 
G G G 
'a ;y, (3 
E E E 
a;y;() 
E E E 
1 2 
(af3,a,~) {1,2} (f)a,a,~) 
•a,y-;T() •cx,y-;i() G G G G G G 
•cx-;iy-;1(3 
'a,y:1() E E E E E E ( af)y,a,[3) 
{1,2} 
•cx-;iy-;i() 
G G G 
•cx;y;() 
E E E 
{1,2} {1,2} 
2 1 
(f)ay,a,f)) 
•cx-;iy-;i() 
G G G 
•cx;y;() 
E E E 
Fig. 7. The Kripke structure for the plant in Fig. 6. 
in its set of possible worlds at w-since (IDES, w) F ''YG V 
"(E. In fact, this is not the case because (IDES, ( a(3, a, /J)) F 
'YE· 
If both agents were to pool their knowledge at a state 
where agent 1 sees a and agent 2 sees (3, so that the resulting 
possible worlds are (a(3, a, /J), ((3a, a, (3), and (a/J7, a, /3), 
the Kripke structure indicates that still there is no distributed 
knowledge about 'YE for the same reasons that the system is not 
Kripke-observable: the conflicting truth value of 'YE at states 
(a/3, a, /3) and (/fo, a, (3). That is, distributed observability 
is not satisfied. 
When distributed observability is not satisfied this tells us 
that at some place, pooling information does not help. In this 
example, by the time agent 1 sees a and agent 2 sees (3, the 
relative ordering of a and /J has been lost, i.e., even if at that 
point agent 2 were to tell agent 1 that it has seen (3, that would 
not convey to agent 1 whether a/3 or /3a had occurred. This 
would suggest that the agents must communicate prior to agent 
1 seeing a and agent 2 seeing /J. 
One possible communication protocol could assume that an 
agent sends a query as soon as it is uncertain about whether to 
disable an event. Unfortunately, such a strategy is highly sen-
sitive to small communication delays. In this example, because 
agent 2 sees and controls only /3, there is never a situation when 
agent 2 is confused about its control decisions. So it never sends 
a query to agent 1. Agent 1 would need to submit a query when 
it sees a. If only a has happened and agent 1 sends a query 
to agent 2, then it would appear that a decision about 1 can be 
made since the pooled information would indicate that the only 
possible world is (a, a, c). However, if /3 had taken place be-
fore agent 2 receives the query, agent 1 would not know whether 
or not to disable 1 since it would not know if f'J had occurred 
just before a or just after a happened. That is, the usefulness of 
pooled information depends on whether /3 can occur after a has 
occurred but before agent 2 receives the query. In other words, 
even if a query results in a response, the solution is sensitive to 
the precise moment the query is received. 
B. Example: When Pooling Knowledge Is Enough 
The legal language corresponding to the legal automaton il-
lustrated in Fig. 8 is not Kripke-observable. Let 2:1 , 0 = {a}, 
RICKER AND RUDIE: KNOW MEANS NO 
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Fig. 8. A plant G and legal automaton E. (Illegal transitions are marked with 
a dashed line.) 
I:i. c = { o:, 'Y }, 2::2, o = {f1, p.}, and 2::2, c = {/3, µ,~I}. Upon 
observing a, agent 1 (which sees only n) does not know if a(J 
or nfJ fl has occurred and hence does not know whether or not to 
disable 'Y- Similarly by observing(!µ, agent 2 would not know 
whether o:(3p or /J')'p. had occurred and could make no decision 
about disabling 'Y- However, we can check the Kripke structure 
and see that distributed observability is satisfied. That is, when 
an agent is unable to make a control decision, pooling informa-
tion will help. In fact, an agent has more flexibility: to submit 
a query every time it is stuck is possibly unnecessary. If each 
agent has available to it a record of the history of its queries 
then it may be possible to deduce further information based on 
queries it has not received from the other agent. We illustrate this 
below. In addition, there remains the issue of when information 
should be pooled. There may be several states where pooling is 
beneficial and it may be possible to ascertain whether communi-
cation should be delayed to the last possible moment or should 
occur as early as possible. 
In this example, as soon as agent 1 sees c~ it does not know 
whether or not to disable 'Y. At what state should it communicate 
or query agent 2 so that they can pool their knowledge? We can 
assume here that communication between agents occurs instan-
taneously so that as soon as one agent cannot continue, the other 
agent receives a query to pool knowledge. In this case, agent 2 
can continue making control decisions until it sees /3fl at which 
point it must submit a query to pool knowledge. On the other 
hand, if agent 2 sees /1/.l but has already received a query from 
agent I (after agent 1 sees o:), then agent 2 no longer needs to 
query as it knows that previously agent l did not know what to 
do about 'Y. Therefore agent 2 can deduce that n must have oc-
curred. 
VI. DISCUSSION 
An interesting point to consider is how robust the structure of 
a problem is with respect to communication and hence a control 
strategy. For instance, in the example of Section V-A, the timing 
of the communication is critical for a solution: agent l must as-
sume that if it sends a query to agent 2 immediately upon seeing 
o: and the resulting possible worlds indicate that agent 2 has seen 
(3 then {j has occurred before a. In contrast with the example ~f Secti~n V-B, once agent 1 has seen a, communication after 
o: occurs or after (J occurs or after µ occurs would all yield a so-
lution to the problem. In this case, there may be characteristics 
of the problem structure (e.g., graph-theoretic properties) that 
make the timincr of communication less critical for generating a b 
solution. 
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Earlier we discussed what it meant for a joint knowledge-
based protocol to solve a decentralized problem where IDES 
was Kripke-observable. If yoEs is not Kripke-observable but 
has distributed observability, then the joint knowledge-based 
protocol K-P is inadequate for solving the problem since com-
munication or querying of other agents now must factor into 
a solution. Previously, control actions were based strictly on 
the knowledge acquired by observing traces of the plant. A re-
vised definition of a knowledge-based protocol that exploits dis-
tributed observability must allow an agent to base its control de-
cisions not only on its views of traces but also on the results of 
queries to other agents. A more "intelligent" protocol could be 
constructed by having each agent record all queries it receives. 
This information tells the queried agent what the other agent 
does not know, which, in tum, could allow the agent to draw 
logical inferences. 
One of the disadvantages to the "sequence-based" version of 
the Kripke structure is that it is possible to generate an infinite-
state Kripke structure. This difficulty can be circumvented in 
two ways: use a "limited-lookahead" strategy or develop a state-
based knowledge model where a possible world is now a set of 
plant states an agent considers the system could be in. Another 
extension to the model would include systems with more than 
two agents. 
The notion of distributed observability for interpreted sys-
tems provides a starting point from which we begin our under-
standing of how agents might communicate to solve a particular 
class of decentralized control problems. Introducing knowledge 
into the analysis of discrete-event systems provides a natural 
way to reason about what agents need to know to cooperatively 
solve a problem. To that end, we believe that using knowledge 
to determine when information should be pooled will lead to 
the development of knowledge-based protocols with communi-
cation for decentralized control problems. 
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